The American Revolution (in Grammar) and the Declaration of Independence (of Syntax) by Dienhart, John M.
American Studies in Scandinavia, Vol. 10, 1978: 1-25 . 
The American Revolution (in 
Grammar) and the Declaration 
of Independence (of Syntax) 
John M. Dienhart 
Odense University 
In  1775 the British Parliament declared that the State of Massa- 
chusetts was in rebellion. 
By a strange quirk of history, that same state has become the 
center of a new rebellion, with the Boston Tea Party replaced by 
the M.I.T. Party. 
The Father of this new revolution is Noam Chomsky, and the 
manifesto a slim volume entitled Syntactic St?uctures, which appeared 
in 1957. 
This book raised the study of syntax to new heights (some critics 
have suggested the opposite direction), and has provided the 
impetus for countless articles, books, and doctoral dissertations in 
the twenty years since its publication. 
To understand something of Chomsky's concept of grammar, 
let us begin in a rather conventional fashion. Consider the sentence: 
(1) The colonists captured Ticonderoga. 
To each of the words in this sentence we can assign traditional 
word class labels (lexical categories) as follows : 
Det N V N 
(2) The colonists captured Ticonderoga 
where Det = Determiner, N = Noun, and V = Verb. Further- 
more, we can provide this sentence with a rather traditional 
constituent analysis, which can then be displayed in the form of a 
(3) Det  N V N I I I 1 
The c o l o n i s t s  captured Ticonderoqa  
If we now label the new nodes (see the circles in (3)) with the 
(non-lexical) categories NP (for Noun Phrase), VP (for Verb 
Phrase), and S (lor Sentence), we get the tree, or Phrase Marker, 
shown in (4) : 
(=) Det N V N 
I 1 I I 
The c o l o r i i s t s  c a p t u r e d  'Ticond-eroga 
I n  addition to such notioas as word class membership and con- 
stituent structure, traditional grammar has also provided us with 
the concept of "grammatical relation." Thus we might say that the 
colonists is "subject" of the sentence in question, and Ticonderoga is 
"direct object" of the verb captured. These relations, says Chomsliy, 
need not be labeled directly, since they are definable in terms of the 
tree diagram we have drawn in (4) : the "subject" will be that NP 
right under (i.e., immediately dominated by) S ;  the "direct object" 
is that NP immediately dominated by VP. 
So far, then, our analysis differs little from that of traditional 
grammar. At this point, however, we can introduce one of the new 
features proposed by Chomsliy: the concept of a formal rule of 
grammar. 
The three (phrase structure) rules in (5) allow us to construct, or 
generate, a simple phrase marker (like that in (4)), down to the 
level of lexical category: 
(5a) S -+NP+VP 
(5b) V P + V f N P  
(5c) NP -+ (Det) +N where () = optional choice 
Ignoring, for the present, the question of just how lexical items are 
to be inserted, we see that these phrase structure rules allow us to 
generate structural descriptions for such sentences as: 
(6) Washington crossed the Delaware 
(7) Cornwallis surrendered his sword 
(8) The colonists dumped the tea 
Returning now to our sentence (1) -which I reproduce here, 
for convenience, as (9) -we observe that there are numerous other 
sentences which, though syntactically quite different, yet make use 
of the same lexical items and are (nearly) equivalent in meaning: 
(9) The colonists captured Ticonderoga 
(10) I t  was the colonists that captured Ticonderoga 
(11) I t  was Ticonderoga that the colonists captured 
(12) What the colonists captured was Ticonderoga 
(13) Ticonderoga was captured by the colonists 
(14) I t  was Ticonderoga that was captured by the colonists 
(15) What was captured by the colonists was Ticonderoga 
(16) I t  was the colonists that Ticonderoga was captured by 
With some patience and effort we could add to and emend phrase 
structure rules (5a, b, c) so that sentences (10) through (16) could 
also be generated directly, but Chomsky has argued that to do so 
we must pay the price of redundancy, complexity, and inelegance 
(see S2ntactic Structures, ch. 5). 
Chomsky chooses instead to introduce a second kind of formal 
rule called a transformation. Unlike phrase structure rules, transfor- 
mations do not build phrase markers from scratch, but rather con- 
vert one phrase marker into another one. 
To see how this solution helps us generate sentences (10) through 
(16), assume first that they, like (9), start out with the structural 
description displayed in (4) (I shall return, in a bit, to the question 
of what "start out" may mean). We can next introduce three 
transformational rules w h i ~ h  may be formulated roughly as 
follows : 
( 1 7a) Passive 
NPd-VSNP,  3 NP2+BEf+VP,,t ,,,t +by+NP1 
(1 7b) Cleft Sentence 
X+NP+Y => i t+ BE,+NP+that+X+Y 
(1 7c) Pseudo-Clej?t Sentence 
X+NP+Y 5 what+ X+Y+BE,+NP 
where RE, represents the (appropriate) finite form of the verb be; 
and X and Y cover any structures to the left and right, respective- 
f 
ly, of NP. 
Let me now try to demystify these rather formidable looking 
rules : 
The passive transformation says, in plain English: to convert an  
active sentence into the corresponding passive one, interchange the 
subject and object, add the preposition by, convert the verb to a 
past participle, and throw in the proper form of the verb be; 
The cleft sentence transformation says: to focus, initially, on a 
noun phrase, move it to the front of the sentence, preceded by it 
and the proper form of be, and followed by the particle that; 
nothing else changes; 
The pseudo-cleft transformation performs a similar function: 
to focus, finally, on a noun phrase, move it to the end of the 
sentence, preceded by the proper form of be; put what at the 
beginning of the sentence. 
To see how these three transformations function and interact, 
let us return to sentences (9) through (16) : 
(9) none of these transformations apply 
(10) only CLEFT applies (to the colonists) 
(1 1) only CLEFT applies (to Ticonderoga) 
(12) only PSEUDO-CLEFT applies (to Ticonderoga) 
(13) only PASSIVE applies 
(14) PASSIVE followed by CLEFT (Ticonderoga) 
(15) PASSIVE followed by PSEUDO-CLEFT (Ticonderoga) 
(16) PASSIVE followed by CLEFT (the colonists) 
Observe that we could even get a sentence such as (18) where all 
three transformations apply, in the order: PASSIVE, CLEFT, 
PSEUDO-CLEFT : 
(18) What it was that was captured by the colonists was 
Ticonderoga. 
I n  Chomsky's system of syntax, then, there are two kinds of 
rules : 
(a) Phrase Structure rules, and 
(b) Transformational rules. 
The former generate the initial phrase marker, or DEEP STRUC- 
TURE, and the latter convert this, via a series of intermediate 
stages, to a final phrase marker, or SURFACE STRUCTURE. 
The number of intermediate stages (each of which is represented 
by a phrase marker) is dependent upon the number of transfor- 
mations which apply in any given instance. Thus if three trans- 
formations apply, the derivation involves four phrase markers (the 
general rule being, of course, that the number of phrase markers in 
a derivation is one more than the number of transformations which 
apply). 
We can note further, with Chomsky, that (somewhat sur- 
prisingly) all transformations appear to be structure dependent. If we 
examine the three transformations we have met so far (l7a, b, c), 
we observe that reference is made not to lexical items per se, nor to 
their relative position in the sentence (first, last, third, etc.), nor to, 
say, their length, but rather to the syntactic category to which they 
belong. That category may be either lexical (such as V), or non- 
lexical (such as NP). 
I t  is noteworthy, for example, that we do not form a passive 
sentence from an active one by simply interchanging the first two 
words, which would be a structurally independent operation. 
Chomslry concludes that structural dependency is a universal 
condition on all transformations, in the grammar of any language. 
To the extent that transformatiom.l rules actually reflect mental 
operations on the part of native speakers (and as you might guess, a 
great deal of ink has been spilt on just this question), this condition 
suggests an interesting property of human language -perhaps, 
some would say, of the human mind itself. 
The fact that transformations seem to be structure dependent 
suggests an  interesting practical use for (some of) them: namely, to 
help determine constituent structure and, in some cases, even the 
identity of the constituent. 
Consider, for example, the class of -ing forms commonly called 
< <  gerunds." Rosenbaum (1967) and Emonds (1972) have pointed 
out that the Cleft Sentence Transformation helps us distinguish 
between true gerunds (i.e., those which function as NP's) and false 
gerunds (what Emonds labels "reduced progressive infinitives"). To 
see how the test works, compare the following two sentences: 
(19a) Washington liked crossing the Delaware 
(19b) Washington began crossing the Delaware. 
Superficially, these sentences look very much alike. They even 
behave alike in allowing an infinitive to replace the -ing form: 
(20a) Washington liked to cross the Delaware. 
(20b) Washington began to cross the Delaware. 
But the similarity stops when we try clefting: 
(21a) I t  was crossing the Delaware that Washington liked 
(21b) *It  was crossing the Delaware that Washington began. 
(I t  is customary these days to use an  asterisk to mark ungrammatical 
sentences.) I n  other words, application of the Cleft Sentence 
Transformation suggests that crossing the Delaware is an N P  in 
(19a) but not in (19b); that is, that it is a gerund phrase in the 
former, but not in the latter. 
However, care must be taken in drawing conclusions based on 
such "trial by transformation." There are several pitfalls for the 
unwary. Here are two of them: 
(a) The test identifies constituents only at that stage in the 
derivation at which the rule applies. Thus, the cleft sentence 
test doesn't necessarily have anything to say about gerund 
status at earlier (or later) stages in the derivation. 
(b) The transformational rule itself may prove to be improperly 
formulated. I t  is sobering to note that there is hardly a 
transformation alive today that has not been to the doctor at 
least once. 
Our own Cleft Sentence Transformation, as formulated in (17b), 
needs to be doctored, as the following data make clear: 
(22a) Washington crossed the Delaware in the winter 
(22b) I t  was in the winter that Washington crossed the Delaware 
(23a) Washington crossed the Delaware because he wanted to 
surprise the British 
(23b) I t  was because he wanted to  surprise the British that Washing- 
ton crossed the Delaware. 
I t  appears that we can use clefting to focus not only on NP's, but 
also on prepositional phrases (22a,b) and subordinate clauses 
(23a,b). I n  other words, it seems to be a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for NP-hood that a constituent can be focused 
by clefting. 
Another, even more basic, problem is due to what we might call 
the TRADE-OFF RELATION. We have already observed that a 
transformational grammar contains two types of rules: phrase 
structure rules (PS-rules) and transformational rules (T-rules) . 
Now the problem is this: how does one decide when a given con- 
stituent is to be generated by a transformational rule, when by a 
phase structure rule? The problem is a very real one, since it is 
generally, if not always, the case that both options are available. 
Recall that in analyzing sentences (9) through (16) we chose to 
generate (9) directly by PS-rules (strictly speaking, this is not quite 
true; no sentence ever surfaces without at least one T-rule apply- 
ing) ; sentences (10) through (16) were then derived by the appli- 
cation of (optional) transformations. I suggested at that time that 
such a solution was somehow the "simplest" and most "elegant" one, 
though no one knows just exactly how to measure "simplicity" and 
"elegance," particularly for partial grammars (Chomsky has 
stressed that it is the complete grammar that must be evaluated, not a 
grammar fragment, since complicating one rule may result in 
simpler rules elsewhere in the grammar, and vice versa; un- 
fortunately, no one has yet, nor is anyone about to, come up with 
a complete grammar for any natural language). Still, we can, in 
theory if not in practice, ofler one criterion for dealing with the 
TRADE-OFF relation : 
(a) the SIMPLICITY PRINCIPLE: evaluate most highly that 
combination of PS-rules and T-rules ~vhich in the 
simplest grammar. 
Another intriguing criterion that has been suggested is 
[b) the UNIVERSAL BASE HYPOTHESIS : all natural 
languages make use of the same, or highly similar, base 
(=  PS) rules. 
This hypothesis is appealing since, if true, it would not only go a 
long way toward solving the TRADE-OFF problem (we would 
still have to find that universal base), it would also help account for 
the fact that children the world over, regardless of social background 
or intellectual ability, learn their native language in an amazingly 
short time (amazing, at least, from the grammarian's point of 
view; contrast the child's feat with the fact that grammarians, 
working in concert for more than two thousand years, have not yet 
been able to construct a complete grammar for a single natural 
language). 
Unfortunately, there is a major problem with the UNIVERSAL 
BASE HYPOTHESIS: it can not be falsified. I n  fact, i t  has been 
demonstrated (see Peters, 1970; Peters and Ritchie, 1969, 1971, 
1973) that there is an infinite number of such universal bases, and 
even that the number of base rules can be reduced to two. This 
unhappy result is due to the fact that transformations, in their 
present form, are much too powerful. Just how transformations are 
to be constrained is one central area of research (see, for example, 
Ross, 1967; Emonds, 1970, 1972; Chomsky, 1973). One of the 
more general operating principles (formulated after the publication 
of Qntactic Structures), and one which has a direct bearing on the 
TRADE-OFF relation is 
(c) the MEANING-CONSERVING PRINCIPLE : Transfor- 
mations must not alter meaning. 
There has been considerable debate about the appropriateness of 
this hypothesis (see, for example, Partee, 1971). Some critics have 
even argued that no one could suggest such a hypothesis unless he 
were highly insensitive to the nuances of language-and such 
insensitivity, in a grammarian, is as disastrous as a tin ear in a 
phonetician. Such critics hold the not unreasonable view that there 
are no cases of true synonymy, i.e. that no two sentences ever have 
exactly the same meaning. If this be true, then a principle such as 
(c) would outlaw transformations altogether. 
Now, of course such an argument is not quite valid since in 
Chomsky's theory transformations do not actually change one 
sentence into another sentence, but rather one phra.se marker into 
another, or, if you like, one abstract string into another (less 
abstract) string. I n  other words, hypothesis (c) is based on the 
assumption that all phrase m~rkers  in any given derivation are synony- 
mous. Of course, i t  would have to follow, if true sentence synonymy 
does not exist, that no one deep structure could ever give rise to 
more than one surface structure, or, equivalently, that there are no 
optional transformations (such as our CLEFT and PSEUDO- 
CLEFT), but only obligatory ones. Admittedly, this would still 
call into question one of the basic tenets of transformational 
grammar (a major attraction of TG has been its elegant accounting 
of alleged cases of synonymy and ambiguity). On the other hand, 
it is no coincidence, I think, that many transformations which 
once were held to be optional have since been reformulated as 
obligatory. This point I shall examine in some detail, after pro- 
posing a fourth principle which has played a role in the TRADE- 
OFF relation : 
(d) the CONTINUITY PRINCIPLE: phrase structure rules 
must not introduce discontinuous constituents. 
Consider now such sentences as : 
(24) The British should have evacuated Boston 
(25) Should the British have evacuated Boston? 
(26) The British should not have evacuated Boston. 
If we assume, with Chomsky, that helping (or auxiliary) verbs 
form a constituent in deep structure, then the CONTINUITY 
PRINCIPLE (d) dictates that (24) must, in some sense, underlie 
(25) and (26), since only in (24) do the auxiliary verbs should and 
have form a continuous constituent. We may conclude, therefore, 




The B r i t i s h  shou ld  have  evacua t ed  Bos ton  
I n  Syntactic Structures, Chomsky used two optional transformations, 
QUESTION and NEGATION, to create the necessary discon- 
tinuities. Thus (25') would result from (24') by the QUESTION 
transformation : 
and (26') is derived from (24') by means of the NEGATION 
transformation : 
(25') AUX % Aux A 
S 
w) Dl**~ NP 1 
N 
I 
The B r i t i s h  shou ld  n o t  have  evacua t ed  Boston 
9-- i 
I t  can be seen that the QUESTION transformation creates a 
discontinuity by fronting the first auxiliary verb (call it Aux,), and 
the NEGATION transformation does so by inserting the word not 
after the first auxiliary. These two rules can be formulated as 
follows : 
I N D 1 TJ I Should t h e  B r i t i s h  have  evacua t ed  Bos ton  
(27) QUESTION 
NP+Aux,+X 3 Aux,+NP+X 
(28) NEGATION 
X+Aux,+Y 3 X+Aux,+not+Y 
We have here, incidentally, an embarrasisng problem, one which 
has pestered transformationalists since 1957: as (27) and (28) 
make clear, it is not the category Aux, but the subcategory Aux, 
which is crucial in such operations as negation and interrogation. 
But while Aux can easily be introduced by a PS-rule such as (29) : 
(29) S + NP +Aux f VP 
i t  is not so easy to incorporate the variable category Aux,. However, 
this is not the issue I wish to consider here. Rather, I want to point 
out that Chomsky's theory underwent a major change between 
1957 and 1965 with the addition of the MEANING-CONSERV- 
ING principle. 
I t  is clear that (24), (25), and (26) have much in  common: the 
same subject, the same direct object, the same lexical items (except 
for not). But i t  is also clear that they do not mean the same thing. 
- 
So here are two cases where transformations alter meaning. How- 
ever, on the basis of work done by Lees, Klima, Katz and Postal, 
Chomsky in 1965 (Aspects, p. 132) proposed the following altera- 
tion: introduce, in the base, a special kind of "marker" to label a 
string as (optionally) negative and/or interrogative. As a result of 
this addition, the NEGATION and QUESTION transformations 
are converted into obligatory transformations triggered by the 
presence of these markers. This is a classic example of what I have 
called the TRADE-OFF. 
A similar fate was in store for the PASSIVE transformation. 
Whereas it had originally been an optional rule in 1957, by 1965 
(Aspects, pp. 103-106) it had become obligatory, dependent on the 
presence, in deep structure, of a special passive marker. The 
reformulation seemed to be necessary because of the existence of 
English verbs which, though they behave like ordinary transitive 
verbs in taking a "direct object," yet misbehave in that they fail to 
passivize. Examples of such verbs, which Lees has called "middle 
verbs," are given in sentences (30) through (32) : 
(30a) Washington resembles Cornwallis 
(30b) "Cornwall is resembled by Washington 
(3 la)  Washington weighed 180 pounds 
(31b) "180 pounds was weighed by Washington 
(32a) The British had a tough time at Bunker Hill 
(32b) *A tough time was had by the British at  Bunker Hill. 
(Note, incidentally, that if we replace tough by good, and substitute 
all for the British, we get the surprisingly grammatical (33) : 
(33) A good time was had by all at  Bunker Hill 
This anomaly is generally relegated to the "idiom" bag.) The 
problem now is this: how do we allow our grammar to generate the 
(a) sentences above, while blocking the ungrammatical (b) 
sentences ? 
One approach might be to adopt an innovation proposed by one 
of Chomsky's former students, now ardent critic, George Lalioff. 
We could add the rule feature [-Passive] to such lexical items as 
resemble, weigh and have. But such a "solution" not only seems ad hoc, 
i t  has the disadvantage of increasing the power of a grammar 
which is already overly powerful (as noted by Bach, 1974 : 215). 
For by adding the notion of "rule feature" we (a) widen the concept 
of "lexical item," (b) allow the lexicon to participate in the TRADE- 
OFF relation, and (c) give to transformations the added power of 
peeking "inside" lexical items. 
I Although Lakoff's innovation may indeed prove to be a necessary 
addition to transformational theory (and Lakoff is not alone in  
believing that the proof has already been provided, in Lakoff 
1970), Chomsky managed in  1965 to solve, without recourse to 
rule features, the problem posed by "middle verbs." His solution is 
based on the observation by Lees that "middle verbs," unlike true 
transitive verbs, do not generally collocate with manner adverbials. 
Contrast, for example, (34) with (35) : 
(34) Washington slowly crossed the Delaware 
(35) "Washington slowly resembled Cornwallis. 
Consequently, rather than introduce the rule feature [-Passive], 
we can subcategorize verbs in the lexicon according to whether or 
not they can co-occur with manner adverbials. And by adding rules 
of subcategorization and co-occurrence to the base, we can put 
more stringent controls on lexical insertion. To understand more 
clearly the point being made here, we must now face squarely an 
issue which I have hitherto skirted: just how do lexical items get 
put into phrase markers? 
Basically, there are three competing views, which we might for 
convenience label as follows : 
(36a) the CONTEXT-FREE approach 
(36b) the CONTEXT-SENSITIVE approach 
(36c) the LEXICAL DECOMPOSITION approach. 
The first view (36a) characterizes Chomsky's early work (Syntactic 
Structures, for example), and it still has a few adherents, though 
Clzomsliy himself has since abandoned i t  in favor of the second 
approach (36b). The third technique, that of lexical decomposition 
(36c), is one which Chomsky opposes, though i t  is held by an in- 
creasing number of his own students and colleagues. 
The CONTEXT-FREE approach assumes that lexical items are 
inserted, as unanalyzable units, by simple context-free phrase 
structure rules such as: 
(37) Det + a, the, etc. 
(38) N + Washington, Cornwallis, Delaware, fort, sword, 
etc. 
(39) V + capture, cross, evacuate, drink, etc. 
This implies that given a phrase marlier such as (40) : 
Det N 
we may apply the lexical insertion rules (37) through (39) to 
obtain, for example, not only: 
(4la)  Washington crossed the Delaware 
(41b) Cornwallis captured the fort 
but also such questionable strings as: 
(41c) Washington drank the fort 
(41d) Cornwallis evacuated the sword. 
(I ignore here the question of tense, since this is not directly 
, relevant.) 
Since a grammar, according to Chomsk~, must be capable of 
generating all the "grammatical" sentences and none of the "un- 
grammatical" ones, the issue here is whether or not strings like 
(4lc) and (41d) are "grammatical." Originally Chomsky held that 
they were, i.e. that such strings were semantically anomalous, but 
syntactically well-f ormed (see Syntactic Structures, pp. 15-1 6). 
By 1965, however, he had changed his mind, and his book 
Aspects of the The09 of Syntax describes the apparatus he feels is ne- 
cessary to block strings like (41c) and (41d). Without going into 
details, what Ghomsky's new proposal does, basically, is make 
lexical insertion CONTEXT-SENSITIVE. Through the use of 
features, he allows for a more delicate subcategorization of lexical 
items, and for selectional restrictions to obtain between nouns and 
verbs (see Aspects, ch. 2) .  For example, the verb drink might be 
This matrix contains the information (a) that drink is a verb, (b) 
that i t  is a transitive verb (takes a direct object NP), and (c) that 
it requires an animate subject as well as (d) a liquid object. Since 
fort will not be marked as [+liquid], (41c) will not be generated. 
Chomsky claims, furthermore, that there is a distinction between 
features such as (42a, b) on the one hand, and (42c, d) on the other. 
The former, which involve only category symbols, he calls strict 
subcategorization features; the latter, which incorporate labels 
like animate and liquid, he calls selectional restriction (i.e, co- 
occurrence) features. The co-occurrence of drink and fort, then, 
would violate a selectional restriction feature. 
Not every transformationalist is convinced that selection restric- 
tions are part of syntax. A feature like [+liquid] looks suspiciously 
semantic. Consider an analogous example, which 1 adapt from an 
observation of James McCawley's. Upon introspection, any native 
speaker of English understands that the verb tv does not normally 
collocate with any inanimate subject. Yet, if George TVashington 
had suddenly begun shouting : 
(43) My toothbrush is trying to kill me 
he would not have been advised to brush up on his English gram- 
mar, but would probably have been relieved of his command 
instead. 
The use of features of strict subcategorization, on the other hand, 
seems to be less suspect, though the difference between these two 
types of features is not, I think, as clear-cut as Chomsky's Aspects 














seems to imply. Since the distinction depends on what we are 
willing to regard as a category symbol, considerable latitude exists 
until firm restrictions are put on the type and number oi different 
categories which PS-rules are permitted to introduce. Thus, the 
problem posed by "middle verbs'' is handled by Chomsky in terms 
of strict subcategorization, since he feels lree to add to the base two 
new categories, namely Manner and Passive. These can be inserted 
by incorporating PS-rules such as: 
(44) VP -+ V+ (NP) + (Manner) 
(45) Manner +- by +Passive 
which permit the generation of a phrase marker like (46) : 
by Passive 
The verb in this tree will automatically be subcategorized as (47) : 
In  other words, no verb can be inserted in this tree unless it is 
marked in the lexicon as permitting both a "direct object" NP and 
a Manner adverbial. Since a verb like resemble will not be so niar- 
ked, it cannot be inserted in such a tree. Consequently, the verb re- 
semble will never be subject to passivization, and our grammar will 
no longer generate the undesirable (30b) *Cornwallis is resembled 
by Washington. 
Note that, in Chomsky's solution to the "middle verb" problem, 
even though lexical insertion is now feature-dependent, the Passive 
transformation is not. I t  is still governed solely by categorial in- 
formation in the phrase marker. Thus, this solution differs in 
principle from one that would make the Passive transformation 
dependent on a rule feature such as [&Passive]. 
Can all transformations be so constrained that they depend only 
on configurations of category symbols, and never on lexical 
features of any kind? This question is part of a larger issue which 
we might lable and define as in (48) : 
(48) TRANSFORMATIONAL PRIVYLEGE : How much 
information, and what kind of information, ought trans- 
formations be privy to ? 
Since transformations are already too powerful, we must, according 
to Chomsky, view with skepticism any proposal which would 
increase that power. Consequently, the burden of proof rests with 
anyone who would propose to make transformations privy to 
information other than that provided by configurations of category 
symbols. 
Actually, Chomsky himself has made use of transformations 
employing such lexical features as [&Animate] and [&Human], 
and this as early as Syntactic Structures (see p. 69; but note the 
escape clause in footnote 2) .  Consider, for example, the trans- 
formational analysis of relative clauses. A sentence like (49) has 
generally been assumed to be derived from an underlying string 
such as (50) : 
(49) The fort which the colonists captured was Ticonderoga 
(50) The fort -the colonists captured the fort -was Ticon- 
deroga. 
The crucial transformation here is RELATIVIZATION, which 
accomplishes two things : 
(a) i t  replaces the second instance of the fort with the relative 
pronoun which, and 
(b) it moves that pronoun to the front of the embedded 
sentence. 
Diagram (51) may be helpful in envisioning these operations. The 
arrow shows what effect RELATIVIZATION will have on this 
phrase marker : 
/ 
NP 
,the c o i o n i s t s  c- p t u r e y  fbr  
'. 





The point to note here is that if indeed i t  is the RELATIVIZA- 
TIQN transformation which is to be responsible for inserting 
relative pronouns, then that transformation must be privy to the 
following information: is the deleted noun "human" or not? If 
human, then the rule puts in who or whom; if non-human, it inserts 
which. This will account not only for the grammaticality of (49) 
(since fort is non-human), but also for such data as: 
'A I I / n e t  N I 1: 
,Jas T i c o n a e r o g a  
(52) *The fort whom the colonists captured was Ticonderoga 
(53) The man who captured Ticonderoga was Ethan Allan 
(54) *The man which captured Ticonderoga was Ethan Allan. 
This analysis suggests that categorial information alone will not do. 
The RELATIVIZATlON transformation must have access to the 
lexical feature [&Human]. 
Note further that this transformation must also be privy to 
information regarding the identity and coreferentiality of consti- 
tuents. Relativization could not, for example, apply to a string 
such as (55), even though this is a string that could be generated 
by Chomsky's (1965) base rules: 
(55) The-fort -the colonists captured the town -was Ticonderoga 
I n  order to block RELATIVIZATION in this case (and, ulti- 
mately, to prevent a string like (55) from surfacing as an English 
sentence), we need to constrain the transformation. Paradoxically, 
this must be done by giving it access to more information. We can 
formulate the condition, broadly, as a constraint on pronominaliza- 
tion in general: 
(56) the IDENTITYICOREFEREYTIAL CONDITION: A 
transformation may only pronominalize a NP if that N P  
is identical to and coreferential with some other NP in 
the sentence. 
Though this is a necessary condition, it is not a sufficient one. Tilie 
can add that, in general, Pronominalization is forwards and not 
backwards-that is, it is generally the second, not the first, of the 
two NP's that is pronominalized. This is illustrated by examples 
(57) through (GO), where the underlying strings are given in (a), 
forward pronominalization in (b), and (the ungrammatical) back- 
ward pronominalization in (c) . Identity of subscripts indicates 
coreferentiality : 
(57) Relative Pronouns : 
(a) The fort -the colonists captured the fort -was Ticonderoga 
(b) The fort which the colonists captured was Ticonderoga 
(c) *Which the colonists captured the fort was Ticonderoga 
(58) Reflexive Pronouns : 
(a) The ragged soldiers defended the ragged soldiers well 
(b) The ragged soldiers defended themselves well 
(c) * Themselves defended the ragged soldiers well 
(59) Possessive Pronouns : 
(a) Washington often despaired over the condition of Washing- 
ton's army 
(b) Washington, often despaired over the condition of his, army 
(c) *He, often despaired over the condition of Washington'si 
army 
(60) Personal Pronouns : 
(a) Cornwallis didn't suspect that Cornwallis would be forced to 
surrender at Yorktown 
(b) Cornwallis, didn't suspect that he, would be forced to 
surrender at Yorktown 
(c) *Hei didn't suspect that Cornwallis, would be forced to 
surrender at Yorktown 
Although all the (c) strings here are ungrammatical, there are some 
cases where backward pronominalization is allowed : 
(61a) Though the Americans were outnumbered at Bunker Hill, 
the Americans fought bravely (Underlying string) 
(61b) Though the Americansi were outnumbered at  Bunker Hill, 
t h g ,  fought bravely (Forward pronominalization) 
(61c) Though thg, were outnumbered at Bunker Hill, the 
Americans, fought bravely (Backward pronominalization) 
The general constraint seems to be: 
(62) "Pronominalization cannot occur backwards except into 
a subordinate clause" (Bach, 1974: 274). 
Ignoring possessive pronouns, whose deep structure is extremely 
problematical (one suggestion would derive Wushington's army 
from the army which Washington has), note the rather surprising fact 
that the relative, reflexive, and personal pronouns cited in (57) 
through (61) are in complementary distribution. This distribution 
depends on the relationship between the two coreferential NP's. If 
both NP's are in the same simple sentence, we get a reflexive 
pronoun. If the two NP's are in different clauses, we get either a 
relative pronoun (in case one of the clauses is subordinate to one 
of the NP's), or a personal pronoun. This suggests that the RE- 
LATIVIZATION transformation may need to be reformulated so 
as to integrate it into a more general process of PRONOMINA- 
LIZATION. 
Be that as it may, one point seems clear: in Chomsky's system, 
pronominalization transformations need to refer not only to categ- 
orial information, but also to notions of formal identity and core- 
ference, as well as to features such as [&Human] for relatibe 
pronouns (not to mention the more traditional "grammatical" 
categories of number, case and gender, which are needed for the 
proper insertion of the non-relative pronouns in our examples). 
Since Chomsky claims that syntax is independent of semantic 
considerations (but see Aspects, pp. 75-79), he is forced to conclude 
that aspects such as these are syntactic rather than semantic. 
For those who do not agree with Chomsky, those who would 
argue that such considerations are semantic in nature rather than 
syntactic, there are at least two paths open: 
(63a) Option I :  Refuse to extend TRANSFORMATIONAL 
PRIVYLEGE to include such notions as coreference and 
humanness, since they are "semantic" ; 
(63b) Ojtion 2: Extend TRANSFORMATIONAL PRIVY- 
LEGE to include them anyway, even though they may 
be "semantic." 
Adopting the first option allows one to maintain an autonomous 
syntax. This approach has been taken by a few of Chomsky's more 
recent students (see, for example, Dougherty 1969 and Jacliendoff 
1972). The option is made possible by what I have labeled the 
TRADE-OFF relation. Instead of treating pronominalization as a 
transformational process, one may allow PS-rules to insert pronouns 
directly. In  other words, the (b) sentences in (57) through (60) 
can be generated directly by the base, without positing the under- 
lying (a) strings, and we can simply throw out all pronominalization 
transformations. This solution, of course, imposes a heavier burden 
on the PS-rules and/or rules of semantic interpretation, since now 
it is these rules which must block the (c) strings (as well as the (a) 
strings). This is but another illustration of the excessive power of 
the present theory. Without additional constraints on the various 
components of a transformational grammar, too many alternative 
solutions are possible. 
The second option which I mentioned (63b) essentially abandons 
Chomsky's claim that syntax is independent of semantics. This 
view, which has become increasingly popular among transfor- 
mationalists since the late 1960's, holds that it was a mistake to try 
to construct (as Chomsky has done and continues to do) purely 
syntactic deep structures which then can be subjected to semantic 
interpretation. Instead, the theory ought to allow for the generation 
of underlying semantic structures, perhaps in the form of phrase 
markers. Transformations may then make use of any information 
available in such phrase markers, be it semantic or syntactic. I t  has 
even been suggested that the distinction between syntax and 
semantics is an artificial one, or at least a bery fuzzy one (Chomsky 
himself has remarked on this possibility; see Aspects, p. 77). 
This new position is generally referred to as GENERATIVE 
SEMANTICS, as opposed to Chomsky's INTERPRETIVE 
SEMANTICS. 
One of the characteristics of this new development is that 
LEXICAL DECOMPOSITION (recall (36c)) is permitted. That 
is, lexical items may be decomposed into alleged SEMANTIC 
PRIMES, and these primes can appear in underlying phrase 
markers. One of the new roles of transformations, then, is to 
assemble these atomic particles of meaning into lexical wholes. 
To illustrate, let us consider a proposal by James McCawley 
(1968) that the English word kill can be decomposed into the four 
semantic primes CAUSE-BECOME-NOT-ALIVE. Then a sen- 
tence such as (64) might have an underlying structure such as (65) : 





Note first of all that the tree has become much more abstract than 
any of Chornsky's. In particular, each of the semantic primes is 
treated here as an underlying (logical) predicate with the result 
that the superficially simple sentence (64) derives from an under- 
lyin
g 
structure containing four "sentences." 
If we now incorporate a new transformation, PREDICATE 
RAISING, which can optionally move any of the predicates in 
(65) into the S directly above it, we can create combinations of 
semantic primes which can then be lexicalized. Some of the 
options are given in (66) through (69) : 
No Predicate Raising 
(66a) The soldier CAUSED the Indian to BECOME NOT 
ALIVE 
(66b) =The soldier caused the Indian to become not alive 
Raise One Time 
(67a) The soldier CAUSED the Indian to BECOME NOT- 
ALIVE 
(67b) =The soldier caused the Indian to become dead 
Raise Two Times 
(68a) The soldier CAUSED the Indian to BECOME-NOT- 
ALIVE 
(68b) =The soldier caused the Indian to die 
Raise Three Times 
(69a) The soldier CAUSED-BECOME-NO T-ALIVE the Indian 
(69b) =The soldier killed the Indian 
An analogous example is due to Barkai (1972). To  fully appreci- 
ate his observation, a moment of briefing is required. Chomsky has 
suggested that most, if not all, adjectival modifiers in English 
derive from (reduced) relative clauses. Thus (70c) is presumed to 
derive from (70a) via (the FALSE STEP; see Zwicky, 1974) (70b) : 
(70a) The colo~zists-who were angv  -dumped the tea over- 
board 
(70b) *The colonists a n g y  dumped the tea oberboard 
(70c) The a n g y  colonists dumped the tea overboard. 
In  other words, a transformation (called WHIZ DELETION) 
optionally removes the relative pronoun who and the copula were 
in (70a) to give the intermediate (False Step) (70b); then an 
obligatory rule of ADJECTlVE PREPOSING converts (70b) to 
(7Oc). 
Consider now the issue raised by Barka'i: the issue of preposed 
past participles in English. Examples (71) through (74), which 
rely heavily on Barkai', illustrate the problem: 
(71a) The murdered (drowned, stabbed, strangled, etc.) soldier 
was only one of many casualties 
(71b) *The killed soldier was only one of many casualties 
(72a) Washington's polished (scrubbed, sterilized, deoxydized, 
etc.) sword was saved for posterity 
(72b) *Washington's cleaned sword was saved for posterity 
(73a) The stolen (purloined, pilfered, appropriated, etc.) 
equipment was never recovered 
(73b) *The taken equipment was never recovered 
(74a) The muttered (murmured, shouted, whispered, etc.) 
oath astonished the captain 
markers. Transformations may then make use of any information 
available in such phrase markers, be it semantic or syntactic. I t  has 
even been suggested that the distinction between syntax and 
semantics is an artificial one, or at least a bery fuzzy one (Chomsky 
himself has remarked on this possibility; see Aspects, p. 77). 
This new position is generally referred to as GENERATIVE 
SEMANTICS, as opposed to Chomsky's INTERPRETIVE 
SEMANTICS. 
One of the characteristics of this new development is that 
LEXICAL DECOMPOSITION (recall (36c)) is permitted. That 
is, lexical items may be decomposed into alleged SEMANTIC 
PRIMES, and these primes can appear in underlying phrase 
markers. One of the new roles of transformations, then, is to 
assemble these atomic particles of meaning into lexical wholes. 
To illustrate, let us consider a proposal by James McCawley 
(1968) that the English word kill can be decomposed into the four 
semantic primes CAUSE-BECOME-NOT-ALIVE. Then a sen- 
tence such as (64) might have an underlying structure such as (65) : 





Note first of all that the tree has become much more abstract than 
any of Chornsky's. In particular, each of the semantic primes is 
treated here as an underlying (logical) predicate with the result 
that the superficially simple sentence (64) derives from an under- 
lyin
g 
structure containing four "sentences." 
If we now incorporate a new transformation, PREDICATE 
RAISING, which can optionally move any of the predicates in 
(65) into the S directly above it, we can create combinations of 
semantic primes which can then be lexicalized. Some of the 
options are given in (66) through (69) : 
No Predicate Raising 
(66a) The soldier CAUSED the Indian to BECOME NOT 
ALIVE 
(66b) =The soldier caused the Indian to become not alive 
(74b) *The said oath astonished the captain. 
What is of interest here is the fact that the (a) sentences are all 
grammatical, whereas the seemingly parallel (b) sentences are not. 
Barkai suggests that an explanation for this discrepancy is 
perhaps to be found in the semantic content of the participles. 
More specifically, he argues that the participles in the (a) sentences 
are more complex, semantically, than those in the corresponding 
(b) sentences. 
Barkai proposes that each of the participles in the (a) sentences 
is semantically decomposable into two parts: a prime manifested 
by the participles in the parallel (b) sentences, plus some sort of 
adverbial modifier. Thus we might analyze the "complex" verbs as 
follows : 
(71c) murder = KILL+Adverb (with MALICIOUS IN- 
TENTION) 
(72c) polish = CLEAN+Adverb (by RUBBING) 
(73c) steal = TAKE f Adverb (in UNLAWFUL manner) 
(74c) mutter = SAY+Adverb (in LOW and INDISTINCT 
manner) 
Preposing of past participles could then be made dependent upon 
such semantic structures: if only a simple prime, without adverbial 
modifier, is present then preposing is blocked. 
Proposals such as these by M~Cawley  and Barka'i have far- 
reaching consequences for transformational theory. Not only are 
some transformations (such as PREDICATE RAISING) now 
allowed to operate befow lexical insertion is complete, others (such 
as TVHIZ DELETION and/or ADJECTIVE PREPOSING) are 
made openly dependent on semantic structure. In  Chomsky's 
system such situations are strictly outlawed. 
Another innovation is that the notion of synonymy (or para- 
phrase) is considerably extended. Thus, for McCawley, all the (b) 
sentences in (66) through (69) are derived from the same under- 
lying structure, namely (65). In  other words, these sentences are 
all to be viewed as synonymous provided (and apparently most 
generative semanticists subscribe to this proviso) that transfor- 
mations are not allowed to alter meaning. In  Chomsky's system, 
on the other hand, the (b) sentences all have different deep struc- 
tures, and it is up to the rules of semantic interpretation to account 
for the obvious similarities in meaning. 
But there is a further issue which many of the old guard find 
(74b) *The said oath astonished the captain. 
What is of interest here is the fact that the (a) sentences are all 
grammatical, whereas the seemingly parallel (b) sentences are not. 
Barkai suggests that an explanation for this discrepancy is 
perhaps to be found in the semantic content of the participles. 
More specifically, he argues that the participles in the (a) sentences 
are more complex, semantically, than those in the corresponding 
(b) sentences. 
Barkai proposes that each of the participles in the (a) sentences 
is semantically decomposable into two parts: a prime manifested 
by the participles in the parallel (b) sentences, plus some sort of 
adverbial modifier. Thus we might analyze the "complex" verbs as 
follows : 
(71c) murder = KILL+Adverb (with MALICIOUS IN- 
TENTION) 
(72c) polish = CLEAN+Adverb (by RUBBING) 
(73c) steal = TAKE f Adverb (in UNLAWFUL manner) 
(74c) mutter = SAY+Adverb (in LOW and INDISTINCT 
manner) 
Preposing of past participles could then be made dependent upon 
such semantic structures: if only a simple prime, without adverbial 
modifier, is present then preposing is blocked. 
Proposals such as these by M~Cawley  and Barka'i have far- 
reaching consequences for transformational theory. Not only are 
some transformations (such as PREDICATE RAISING) now 
allowed to operate befow lexical insertion is complete, others (such 
as TVHIZ DELETION and/or ADJECTIVE PREPOSING) are 
made openly dependent on semantic structure. In  Chomsky's 
system such situations are strictly outlawed. 
Another innovation is that the notion of synonymy (or para- 
phrase) is considerably extended. Thus, for McCawley, all the (b) 
sentences in (66) through (69) are derived from the same under- 
lying structure, namely (65). In  other words, these sentences are 
all to be viewed as synonymous provided (and apparently most 
generative semanticists subscribe to this proviso) that transfor- 
mations are not allowed to alter meaning. In  Chomsky's system, 
on the other hand, the (b) sentences all have different deep struc- 
tures, and it is up to the rules of semantic interpretation to account 
for the obvious similarities in meaning. 
But there is a further issue which many of the old guard find 
even more disquieting: generative semantics appears to increase, 
if that is possible, the power of a theory which is already overly rich 
in capability. For not only has TRANSFORMATIONAL PRIVY- 
LEGE been greatly extended, the admission of semantic primes 
has made underlying phrase markers decidedly more remote. 
Unless the concept of "possible semantic prime" can be con- 
strained in some manner, there may be no way to stop the Hydra- 
Iike proliferation of branches in underlying trees. For example, it 
has recently been suggested that an utterance such as 
(751 Washington broke the oar 
derives lrom an underlying structure containing at least eight 
clauses : 
the oar 
Arnold Zwicky has recently proposed (1973 : 473) that we limit 
the Hydra's heads by imposing one or other of the following 
substantive constraints on semantic primes : 
(77a) "Every semantic prime is realizable as a lexical unit 
(root, inflection, or derivational affix) in some natural 
language" 
(77b) "In any language, most semantic primes are realized as 
lexical units" 
(77c) "In any language, all semantic primes are realized as 
lexical units." 
Zwicky feels that (77c), the strongest of these three restrictions, is 
"too much to hope for"; we may have to be content with the weak- 
est constraint, (77a). 
At any rate, the upshot of Zwicky's proposal is that no semantic 
prime may be proposed which is not manifested morphemically in 
some languap-e or other. No purely abstract primes should be 
permitted. 
Though this sounds like a useful restriction, it is sobering to note 
that m n e  of the alleged semantic primes which we have examined 
(CAUSE, BECOME, NOT, ALIVE, KILL, CLEAN, TAKE, 
SAY, DECLARE, PAST, HAPPEN, DO, COME ABOUT, 
BE, BREAK) violate even Zwicky's strongest condition (77c); 
every single one of these "primes" is realizable as an English word 
or morpheme. 
Be that as it may, the search for semantic structures, and for 
these atomic units of meaning, goes on, accompanied otten by 
expectant hope that the isolation of a universal set of semantic 
primes may provide the key to the structure of human language 
and of human thought. 
Needless to say, there are skeptics, not only within the transfor- 
mational camp : 
"Perhaps the reason that semantic representations have proved to be so elusive 
is simply that, after all, there aren't any" (Fodor, Fodor, and Garrett, 1975: 530) 
but also without. Ian Robinson, in his recent book The New 
Grammarians' Funeral (1 975 : x) , writes : 
"Fashions in linguistics come and go with a rapidity which in itself suggests 
something suspect about the essential claim of linguistics, that it is a science. Had 
I been writing fifteen years ago my examples would have been different, and I 
am pretty sure that in another fifteen years they will be out of date." 
' There are many, no doubt, who hope that Robinson is right, 
that "unless the world goes finally mad, unless the human mind in 
our universities loses utterly its grasp of what makes sense" (Robin- 
son, 1975: 185), the theory of transformational grammar, in all its 
varieties, will be allowed to fade quietly away, so that gram- 
marians can go back to doing whatever it was they were doing 
before the Revolution. 
Personally, I believe such desires are premature as well as un- 
realistic. Whatever the future of transformational grammar itself 
may be, I think it is safe to predict that the study of grammar, as a 
result of the Chomskyan Revolution, will never again be the same. 
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